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Abstract 
Purpose and Methods: The standard of proof, beyond reasonable doubt (BRD), serves 
as a threshold for reaching verdicts in criminal cases. Past research has demonstrated that 
factors such as the wording of judicial instructions defining the standard can influence 
people’s interpretation of it. In addition, there is some concern that instructions may not be 
effective for the wider jury-eligible population. In an experimental study involving members 
of the general public, we examined the effect of two commonly used judicial instructions 
(i.e., sure and firmly convinced) against a situation when BRD was undefined, on people’s 
quantitative interpretations of BRD as well as on their self-reported understanding of the 
standard and confidence in applying it. We also explored the effect of juror characteristics 
(i.e., gender, age and education).  
Results: Compared to when the standard was undefined, the sure instruction helped to 
reduce inter-individual variability in interpretations of BRD and the firmly convinced 
instruction increased people’s understanding of the standard. However, neither instruction 
was effective in increasing confidence in applying the standard or in reducing observed 
individual differences.  
Conclusion: These findings underscore the importance of developing evidence-based 
judicial instructions that can benefit the broad jury-eligible population equally and in a 
variety of ways. 
 
 
Keywords: Standard of proof, beyond reasonable doubt, membership function, judicial 
instructions, jury decision-making.  
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Effects of Judicial Instructions and Juror Characteristics on Interpretations of Beyond 
Reasonable Doubt 
Proof ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ (BRD) is the standard of proof used in criminal trials 
in many adversarial justice systems such as in Anglo-American jurisdictions. The standard 
specifies the degree of belief in (or probability of) guilt required for conviction, and as a 
principle of due process it provides a stringent threshold so as to reduce the number of 
innocent defendants being wrongfully convicted. Indeed, BRD has been theorized to be 
equivalent to a level of certainty of .90 (or 90%; see Newman, 1993), although opinions 
differ as to whether the standard should be quantified (e.g., see Kagehiro, 1990 - pro 
quantification and Stoffelmayr & Diamond, 2000 - against quantification).  
While there is empirical evidence showing that some judges and mock jurors interpret 
BRD at around .90 (e.g., McCauliff, 1982; Zander, 2000), there is also evidence 
demonstrating  that interpretations may vary according to case characteristics (e.g., Martin & 
Schum, 1987), such as the severity of the offence, and individual differences in juror attitudes 
(e.g., Devine & Caughlin, 2014; Lundrigan, Dhami, & Mueller-Johnson, 2016). 
Interpretations may in fact be considerably lower than .90 (e.g., Horowitz & Kirkpatrick, 
1996; Simon & Mahan, 1971). 
Some of the differences in numerical interpretations of BRD reported across studies 
are likely to be due to differences in the methods used to elicit individuals’ interpretations 
(such as direct rating, decision theory-based, and Membership Function method) (see Dane, 
1985; Dhami, 2008). However, all methods demonstrate that there is considerable inter-
individual variability in how BRD is interpreted (for a review see Hastie, 1993). For instance, 
Dhami (2008) found that average interpretations of BRD across individuals and methods 
varied from .53 to .96 (or 53% to 96%). Such inter-individual variability in how much 
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evidence jurors require before they are willing to convict can lead to disagreements among 
jurors, and in the most extreme case, to a hung jury.  
A hung jury is followed by the possibility, or in some jurisdictions the requirement, of 
a retrial with all its associated financial costs to the justice system, as well as its 
psychological costs to victims, witnesses, and the defendant. Therefore, it is desirable that 
hung juries do not come about because of differences in the interpretation of BRD. Judicial 
instructions attempting to aid jurors’ correct interpretation of BRD should be worded in a 
way that minimize inter-individual differences in interpretations and make it clear to jurors 
how BRD should be applied.  
Both researchers and courts have expressed concern over the difficulty that people 
may have in understanding the concept of BRD (e.g., Elwork, Sales, & Alfini, 1982; Heffer, 
2006; Power, 1999). In an effort to reduce inter-individual variability in interpretations of 
BRD as well as to bring interpretations closer to that intended, some judges have attempted to 
define the standard for jurors. However, judges may inadvertently influence jurors to overly 
increase or reduce the standard. For instance, the instruction used by the judge in Cage v. 
Louisiana (1990) i.e., “doubt as would give rise to grave uncertainty” and “actual substantial 
doubt” was held be unconstitutional because it was believed to require too high a degree of 
doubt for acquittal, and was thus rejected by the US Supreme Court. In order to avoid such 
situations, standardized instructions have been proposed and a considerable number of 
jurisdictions have adopted them. Currently, there are various different instructions (even 
within a jurisdiction), all of which use qualitative terms (e.g., “moral certainty”) to define 
BRD (Heffer, 2006; Hemmens, Scarborough, & Del Carmen, 1997). Importantly, these are 
not evidence-based (see Dhami, Lundrigan & Mueller-Johnson, 2015).  
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Effect of Judicial Instructions Defining Beyond Reasonable Doubt 
Being ‘Firmly Convinced’ of the Defendant’s Guilt 
One of the most common instructions in the US, advocated by the Federal Judicial 
Center, is the instruction “you must be firmly convinced of the defendant’s guilt”. This 
instruction is also used in at least eleven US states (Hemmens et al., 1997). Another common 
instruction, advocated, for instance, in the UK by the Judicial Studies Board for England and 
Wales, is “you must be sure of the defendant’s guilt”. The majority of English judges and 
magistrates have been found to use some variation of the sure instruction (Heffer, 2006) and 
it is also used in New Zealand (Young, 2003). Across the considerable body of studies 
investigating people’s interpretations of BRD, a few have systematically studied the firmly 
convinced or sure instructions, and we review these below.  
 The evidence for the superiority of the firmly convinced instruction over the 
undefined standard (i.e., BRD) is mixed. As part of a study of five different instructions, 
Horowitz and Kirkpatrick (1996) compared interpretations of BRD under the firmly 
convinced instruction and when the standard was undefined. This was done in the context of 
two hypothetical murder cases where the strength of the evidence was manipulated to be 
weak or strong. A sample of the jury-eligible public was asked to provide their interpretations 
of BRD using a direct rating method at both the pre- and post-deliberation stages of six 
person juries (i.e., they were asked at each time to indicate on a 21-point scale what minimum 
probability of the defendant having committed the crime they required in order to convict). 
Under all conditions, the firmly convinced instruction led to higher numerical interpretations 
of BRD than the undefined standard. Participants also reported greater confidence in their 
verdicts under the firmly convinced instruction than when the standard was undefined. 
Koch and Devine (1999) also compared the firmly convinced instruction against the 
undefined standard. A sample of students in mock juries of four to seven members were 
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asked to render verdicts on a hypothetical murder case that did or did not include a lesser 
charge of manslaughter. Guilty verdicts were used as an indirect measure of the standard of 
proof. Here, mock jurors were asked whether they considered the defendant guilty or not 
guilty at several points when reading the case transcript. The authors reported jurors’ 
decisions after receiving the final instructions (and before deliberation). Given that there were 
more guilty verdicts under the firmly convinced instruction than when the standard was 
undefined, this study did not find that juries had more stringent interpretations of BRD under 
the firmly convinced instruction (i.e., it did not lead to a higher evidentiary threshold) than 
when the undefined standard. 
Being ‘Sure’ of the Defendant’s Guilt 
Variants of the sure instruction have also been investigated. Montgomery (1998) 
examined the interpretations of BRD under the sure instruction in a sample of British adults 
who were the next of kin of university students as well as in a random sample drawn from the 
electoral register. Respondents were asked to judge a hypothetical murder case. Around three 
quarters of the whole sample who found the defendant not guilty said they needed 100% 
confidence of guilt to convict. Of those who gave a guilty verdict, around a third said they 
needed 100% confidence of guilt to convict. This suggests that BRD tended to be interpreted 
above 90%.  
Zander (2000) surveyed samples of randomly selected members of the British general 
public and lay magistrates (judges) for their interpretation of BRD under the sure instruction. 
Here, half of the public and over a third of the lay judges interpreted BRD as 100% certainty. 
Around three-quarters of the public and lay judges interpreted BRD as 90% or higher. A 
small minority of both groups (around 4% to 5%) interpreted BRD to be lower than 70%.  
Thus, the findings from the small body of past research investigating interpretations 
of BRD under the firmly convinced instruction are mixed as to whether the instruction leads 
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to a more or less stringent standard of proof compared to when the standard is undefined. The 
present study contributes to this body of research. The few studies that have examined the 
sure instruction demonstrate that it leads to an extremely stringent standard of proof, although 
these studies have not compared the sure instruction to when BRD is undefined, as we do in 
the present study. This is also the first study to directly compare the firmly convinced and 
sure instructions. 
Effects of Juror Characteristics on Beyond Reasonable Doubt 
As juries are expected to represent a cross-section of the general population, it is 
important to ascertain if different sub-sections of the population have systematically different 
interpretations of BRD, and to explore any differential effect of judicial instructions across 
these sub-sections. Nevertheless, few have investigated the effects of juror characteristics 
such as gender, age and education level on interpretations of BRD either when defined by 
instructions or when left undefined. We found only two relevant published studies, and both 
of these focus solely on gender differences. Zander (2000) found that a slightly greater 
proportion of female than male members of the public interpreted BRD as requiring 100% 
certainty of guilt under the sure instruction. Nagel (1979) found that male students had higher 
interpretations of BRD when undefined than their female counterparts in the context of a 
hypothetical rape case.  
It is important to investigate individual differences in self-reported understanding of 
BRD and jurors’ self-reported confidence in applying the standard because perceived 
difficulties in understanding the law have been shown to be related to juror stress (Bornstein, 
Miller, Nemeth, Page, & Musil, 2005). Having to understand the intricacies of legal and court 
procedures may be an additional, albeit under-researched, source of stress. Bornstein et al. 
(2005) found that although the burden of responsibility carried by jurors was seen as the 
greatest stressor, trial complexity (including an understanding of the law, and deciding on 
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guilt) was reported as the second great stressor. Findings from a UK based juror survey 
suggested that jurors most often reported understanding legal terminology as the most 
difficult aspect of a trial (Matthews, Hancock, & Briggs, 2004). Stress can have a negative 
effect on decision-making such as limiting the information that people attend to and process 
(Mather & Lighthall, 2012). 
 
The Present Study 
The first aim of the study was to examine the effect of judicial instructions for BRD 
(i.e., firmly convinced, sure, and undefined) on people’s interpretations of the standard of 
proof, including inter- and intra-individual variability in interpretations. The second aim was 
to examine the effects of instructions on people’s reported ease/difficulty in understanding 
BRD. The third aim was to examine the effects of instructions on people’s confidence in 
applying the standard. The final aim of the study was to examine the relationship between 
people’s demographic characteristics (i.e., gender, age, and education level) and their 
interpretations of BRD as well as their confidence in applying the standard.  
 
Based on past research it was hypothesized that the sure standard would lead to 
significantly more stringent interpretations of BRD than the undefined standard. As the 
evidence on the firmly convinced instruction is mixed and as there is no prior work 
comparing the firmly convinced and the sure instructions, we make no predictions as to 
whether firmly convinced leads to higher or lower interpretations than the undefined standard 
and as to which of the two, firmly convinced or sure, is interpreted more stringently.  
 Given that judicial instructions were introduced to bring people’s interpretations of 
BRD closer to that intended by the law, it is reasonable to predict that the sure and firmly 
convinced instructions would lead to reduced inter- and intra-individual variability in 
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numerical interpretations of BRD compared to when the undefined standard. Finally, given 
the lack of research on the effect of juror characteristics on people’s interpretations of BRD 
and their confidence in applying the standard we did not make a priori predictions about the 
effects of gender, age and education level on these variables.  
Method 
Participants 
The initial sample consisted of 170 members of the jury-eligible British public who 
volunteered to participate in the study in return for a payment of £10. The data for three 
participants had to be excluded as their MF function ratings were not complete, thus leaving a 
final sample of n = 167. This sample size provides 80% power to detect a Cohen’s dz (the 
effect size for dependent data) of .23, about halfway between a small (0.14) and a medium 
(0.35) dz effect size (Lankin, 2017).  
 
 Fifty-three percent of the sample was male, and 95.8% of the sample described 
themselves as white. On average, participants were 36.30 years old (SD = 10.57; ranging 
from 19 to 69 years). Secondary school (up to age 16) was the highest educational attainment 
for 27.1% of the sample; 30.1% had been to college (up to 18 years), and 42.2% had a 
university education. This is roughly in line with the distribution of education in the general 
public (ONS, 2013)   Fifteen percent of the sample reported having served on a jury in the 
past. On average, participants rated the likelihood of them serving on a jury, if they were 
called for service, as being as 73.0%. 
Design 
We used a mixed  quasi-experimental design. The within-subjects variable was 
judicial instruction which was manipulated and had three levels (i.e., BRD undefined, sure 
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instruction, and firmly convinced instruction). Participant gender, age and education were 
treated as between-subjects variables in the data analyses.  
 
Stimuli and Measures  
Participants were asked to imagine that they were serving on a jury in a criminal trial. 
Each participant was presented with the standard of proof (i.e., BRD undefined, defined as 
sure and firmly convinced). In the undefined condition, the instruction read: “The defendant 
is presumed innocent unless the prosecution has proved guilt beyond reasonable doubt”. In 
the sure condition, the instruction read: “The defendant is presumed innocent unless the 
prosecution has proved guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is 
proof that makes you sure.” Finally, in the firmly convinced condition, the instruction read: 
“The defendant is presumed innocent unless the prosecution has proved guilt beyond 
reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you firmly convinced.”    
Numerical interpretations of BRD were measured using the Membership Function 
method (MF; Dhami, 2008; Dhami et al., 2015; Lundrigan et al., 2016; 2017, Park, Seong, 
Kim & Kim, 2016) which has been shown to be a valid predictor of verdicts (Dhami, 2008; 
Lundrigan et al., 2016; also see Dhami & Wallsten, 2005 for more on the reliability and 
validity of this method). As is typically done in the Membership Function Method, 
participants were presented with 21 scales that each corresponded to one of 21 values, from 
0% to 100% (in 5% intervals; see Appendix). Participants responded to the question “to what 
extent would each of these values substitute for BRD?” Each scale had 21-point points and 
was labeled at each from not at all to absolutely. Responses were provided by circling a point 
on each scale. The MF method provides measures of the ‘peak’ value that absolutely 
substitutes for BRD and the ‘spread’ of values that represent BRD to varying degrees (see 
Appendix).  
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Participants were also asked to report how well they understood each instruction and 
how confident they would be using each instruction in a real trial. Ratings of both 
understanding of BRD and confidence in applying the standard were provided on 7-point 
scales anchored at each end (i.e., understanding: 1 = “very easy” to 7 = “very difficult”, and 
confidence: 1 = “not at all confident” and 7 = “extremely confident”). 
Gender was defined as male versus female. Education was measured as a two level 
variable consisting of “having obtained a university degree” or not.  Age was measured as a 
continuous variable. For any ANOVA in which age was included, age was dichotomized 
using a median split (< 31 years v. 31 years and older), as is common in psychological 
research.  
Procedure 
Participants were recruited from a large UK company based in the East of England 
that employs over 700 people in a wide range of roles from manual labour through clerical 
staff to professionals (i.e., medics). Recruitment posters were placed across the multi-
building site and emails asking for volunteers were sent out to all employees. The data was 
collected individually, on paper, at the recruitment site. The experiment took approximately 
15-20 minutes. Participants first completed the MF method. The order of presentation of the 
three experimental conditions (i.e., BRD undefined, sure instruction, and firmly convinced 
instruction) was counter-balanced across participants. Participants then responded to the 
questions asking about understanding and confidence. Finally, participants provided their 
demographic details (i.e., gender, age, educational background, jury experience and 
willingness to serve on a jury). 
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No experimental conditions were excluded. All measures used in the study are 
reported. Participants were only excluded from this study if they failed to complete the study 
materials, i.e. did not give ratings for all three judicial instructions.  
 
 
Results 
Descriptive Statistics for Dependent Measures 
The last column in Table 1 presents the mean and standard deviations for the peak and 
spread of interpretations of BRD as measured by the MF method as well as the self-reported 
understanding of BRD and confidence in using the standard.  
TABLE 1 HERE 
Effect of Judicial Instructions 
Interpretations of BRD. The first aim of the study was to examine the effect of 
judicial instructions for BRD (i.e., firmly convinced, sure, and undefined) on people’s 
interpretations of the standard, including inter- and intra-individual variability in 
interpretations. Before conducting this analysis, we were interested in examining how close 
people’s interpretations of the standard were to .9 (or 90%). Bonferroni adjusted one-sample 
two-tailed t-tests revealed that the mean peak interpretations of BRD were  
significantly greater than 90% for the undefined condition,  t (160) = 2.55, p = .012, d = -.20  
and  the sure condition, t (164) = 3.09, p = .001, d = -.24. The  firmly convinced condition 
was not significantly different from the 90% threshold, t (164) = 1.89, p = .61, , d = -.14. 
The first row of Table 1 presents the means and standard deviations for the peak 
interpretations of BRD by judicial instruction. A one-way repeated measures ANOVA 
revealed no significant effect of instruction on peak interpretation, F (2, 314) = .677, p = 
.509, partial eta2 = .004, 90% CI [.000; .024]. Since a lack of statistical significance could be 
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due to a lack of statistical power, equivalence tests using the Two One-Sided Tests (TOST) 
procedure for dependent samples (Lakens, 2017) were calculated  to test if the instructions 
were indeed not different from each other 1. As our data had a power of 80% to detect an 
effect size of dz = .23, this was taken as the widest equivalence bounds, in line with the 
suggestion in Lakens (2017). Using Lakens’ (2017) excel based calculator, the comparison of 
the sure versus undefined condition showed that the observed effect size for this difference 
(dz = -.003) showed equivalence given a lower boundary of dz = -.23 and upper boundary of 
dz =.23, i.e. a small effect. This means that if there is a possible difference between the two 
instructions despite the non-significant ANOVA, it must be smaller than a small effect size. 
An analysis for equivalence of the firmly convinced versus undefined conditions using the 
TOST procedure showed that the observed effect size (dz =- .08) was not significant with the 
equivalent bounds of dz = -.14 and dz = .14, t(166) =.79, p= .216; but it was significantly 
within the equivalent bounds of dz = .-.23 and dz = .23, t(166) = 1.95, p=.026. Similarly the 
comparison for the sure and the firmly convinced instruction (observed effect size dz = -.08) 
showed no equivalence at dz = -.14 and dz = .14, t(166) =.75, p= .227; but it was significantly 
within the equivalent bounds of dz = .-.23 and dz = .23, t(166) = 1.91, p=.029. Thus all three 
instructions showed equivalence at a level of a dz =.23 effect size (i.e., a small to medium 
effect).  
Intra-individual variability. The second row in Table 1 presents the means and 
standard deviations for the spread of interpretations of BRD by judicial instruction. A one-
                                                
1 The TOSTprocedure can be used to establish equivalence by testing whether an observed effect size is 
statistically different from a pre-specified effect size boundary (for instance d = ± .3) . The observed effect size 
is examined in a one-way t-test to investigate the null-hypothesis that it is statistically significantly smaller than 
this lower bound (e.g. smaller than d = -.3) and in a second one-way t-test to see if it is statistically significantly 
greater than the upper bound (e.g. bigger than d = .3). If both of these null hypotheses are rejected, then it is 
concluded that the observed effect falls within the pre-specified statistical equivalence bounds (in this example d 
= ± .3), which suggests that the two means tested are close enough to each other to be practically equivalent 
(Lakens, 2017). 
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way repeated measures ANOVA showed no significant effect of instruction on spread F (2, 
314) = .836, p = .434, partial eta2 = .005, 90% CI [.000; .022]. 
Inter-individual variability. Finally, in order to examine the extent of inter-individual 
variability in the peak interpretations of BRD, we computed Pearson correlations followed by 
Pitman-Morgan tests. The correlation between the peak interpretation of BRD when the 
standard was undefined and when it was defined as sure was r (158) = .59, p < .001. The 
correlation between the peak interpretation of BRD under the undefined standard and when it 
was defined as firmly convinced was r (157) = .63, p < .001. The correlation between the 
peak interpretation of BRD when the standard was defined as sure and when it was defined as 
firmly convinced was r (161) = .56, p < .001. The Pitman-Morgan test compares the variances 
for two paired-sample variables, taking into account the correlation between the two variables 
(Kenny, 1953).2 We found a significant difference in the variance of the peak interpretations 
of BRD when the standard was undefined (M = 92.30, variance = 130.64) and when it was 
defined as sure (M = 92.33, variance = 94.09), ttwo-tailed(156)= 2.55, p = .012 (thus smaller 
than the Bonferroni adjusted p-threshold of p = .017) . Here, the inter-individual variability 
was greater in the undefined condition. There was no significant difference in the variability 
of the peak interpretations of BRD when the standard was undefined and when it was defined 
as firmly convinced (M = 91.55, variance = 110.46), ttwo-tailed (156) = 1.34, p = .178 or 
between the sure and the firmly convinced conditions, ttwo-tailed (156) = 1.22, p = .221. 
Self-reported understanding. The second aim of the study was to examine the effect 
of judicial instructions on people’s reported understanding of BRD. A repeated measures 
ANOVA was computed (the Greenhouse-Geisser correction was applied to the F-statistic). 
There was a significant main effect of instruction on people’s understanding of BRD, F (2, 
                                                
2 As the Pitman Morgan Test is not readily available in statistics software packages, the following online 
calculator was used:  http://www.how2stats.net/2011/06/testing-difference-between-correlated.html 
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295) = 4.19, p = .020, partial eta2 = .025, . 90% CI [.003; .061].. Post-hoc t-test comparisons 
using Bonferroni corrections revealed that understanding of BRD was significantly greater 
under the firmly convinced instruction than when the standard was undefined, p = .013 (thus 
smaller than the adjusted p-value .017). No other significant differences between instructions 
were observed, ps > .05.  
Confidence. The third aim was to examine the effect of judicial instructions on 
people’s reported confidence in applying the standard. A repeated measures ANOVA using 
the Greenhouse-Geisser correction showed no significant main effect of instruction on 
confidence in applying BRD, F (2, 311) = 1.20, p = .302, partial eta2 = .007, 90% CI [.000; 
.027]. Confidence in applying the standard was significantly negatively correlated with the 
spread of interpretations of BRD ( i.e. intra-individual variability) when it was undefined, r 
(159) = -.21, p = .005 (and thus larger than the Bonferroni adjusted threshold of p=.017). 
There was no significant correlation for the spread of the interpretation of BRD and 
confidence for the sure instruction, r (163) = .17, p = .168, or the firmly convinced 
instruction,  r (163) = .08, p = .329. 
 
Relationship Between Juror Characteristics and Interpretations of BRD and their 
Confidence in Applying the Standard 
The final aim of the study was to examine if people’s demographic characteristics 
(i.e., gender, age, and education level) are associated with their interpretations of BRD as 
well as their confidence in applying the standard. The findings are presented below. 
Interpretations of BRD. Table 2 presents the means and standard deviations of peak 
interpretations of BRD and spread of interpretations by age, gender and education level. We 
computed mixed ANOVAs on the peak and spread. Judicial instruction was the within-
subjects factor. Age, gender and education level were the between-subjects factors. We 
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performed a median split on age, which had two levels (i.e., < 31 years v. 31 and over). 
Gender had two levels (i.e., male, female), and education had two levels (i.e., university 
educated or not). No statistically significant main effects or interaction effects were observed, 
ps > .05. 
TABLE 2 HERE 
Since age had been was measured on a continuous scale, we also computed 
correlations between age and the peak and spread of interpretations of BRD when the 
standard was undefined, when it was defined as sure and when it was defined as firmly 
convinced. There were no significant correlations between age and peak interpretations of 
BRD when the standard was undefined, or when it was defined as sure and firmly convinced, 
ps > .05. Although there were no significant correlations between age and the spread of 
interpretations of BRD when it was defined as sure or firmly convinced, ps > .05, there was a 
significant positive correlation of r (158) = .17, p = .030, when the standard was undefined. 
However, after adjusting for multiple testing (with a resulting new p-threshold of p=.017), 
this correlation failed to reach significance.  
 
Confidence in Applying BRD. Finally, Table 3 presents the means and standard 
deviations of reported confidence in applying BRD by age, gender and education level. We 
computed mixed ANOVAs on reported confidence in applying BRD. Judicial instruction was 
the within-subjects factor, and age, gender and education level were the between-subjects 
factors. There were significant main effects of gender and education level, whereas the main 
effect of age was marginally significant (gender: F(1,157) = 13.88, p < .001, partial eta2 = 
.081, 90% CI [.026; .155].; education level: F(1,157) = 4.50, p = .036, partial eta2 = .028, 
90% CI [.001; .082]. and age: F(1,157) = 3.68, p = .057, partial eta2 = .023, 90% CI [.000; 
.074]., see Table 3). Self-reported confidence in correctly applying the standard was 
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significantly greater for males than for females (p = .002), for those who were university 
educated than for those without university degree (p = .036) and marginally significantly 
greater for those aged 31 and over than for those who were younger (p = .057). 
TABLE 3 HERE 
In addition, there was a marginally significant two-way interaction effect of gender by 
education level, F(1,157) = 3.71, p = .056, partial eta2 = .023, 90% CI [.000; .075]. As Figure 
1 illustrates, less educated females reported lower levels of confidence in applying BRD than 
their more educated female counterparts. No other significant interaction effects were 
observed. 
FIGURE 1 HERE 
Finally, we also computed correlations between age and confidence in applying BRD 
when it was undefined, defined as sure and defined as firmly convinced. No significant 
correlations were observed, ps > .05.  
 
Discussion 
Given that the legal system confers great responsibility on jurors to make decisions 
that may have severe consequences for the defendant’s liberty and for public safety, the 
system should be responsible for setting out clearly what it asks of jurors, so that jurors can, 
and are confident that they can, accomplish these tasks. Efforts at providing jurors with 
judicial instructions that define the standard of proof have followed from empirical evidence 
suggesting that jurors’ interpretations of BRD are lower than that intended, and may vary 
across jurors, as well as from evidence suggesting that jurors report difficulty in 
understanding the standard. Although the perceived need for judicial instructions was derived 
from empirical evidence, the actual wording of the instructions has not been, to our 
knowledge, based on empirical evidence of how these instructions may be understood.     
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In the present study, we focused on the firmly convinced instruction used in several 
US jurisdictions and the sure instruction used in England and Wales and New Zealand. We 
compared the effect of these two instructions against the effect of leaving the standard 
undefined, on people’s interpretations of BRD, including inter- and intra-individual 
variability in interpretations. We also investigated the effect of instructions on people’s 
reported ease/difficulty in understanding the standard of proof and their confidence in 
applying it. In addition, we studied the relationship between people’s demographic 
characteristics (i.e., gender, age, and education level) and their interpretations of BRD under 
the different instructions, as well as their confidence in applying the standard.  
We found that on average, in each of the three conditions, people interpreted BRD at 
just over .90 (90%), a somewhat more stringent standard than intended by law, but consistent 
with past research (Montgomery, 1998; Zander, 2000). There was no significant effect of 
judicial instructions on people’s interpretations of the standard: interpretations of BRD were 
similar under the sure and firmly convinced instructions, and no different from when the 
standard was undefined. Although Horowitz and Kirkpatrick (1996), using a different 
method, did find a difference in interpretations of BRD under the firmly convinced instruction 
and the undefined standard, our finding of no difference is compatible with research by Koch 
and Devine (1999) who also used a different method. The present findings are also consistent 
with Dhami (2008) who found no significant effect of judicial instructions on interpretations 
of BRD as measured by the MF peak. The present findings thus suggest that existing 
instructions may be unnecessary.  
Although people’s peak interpretations of BRD may be around and above 90%, there 
is often considerable inter- and intra-individual variability in interpretations (e.g., Dhami, 
2008). In the present study, interpretations of BRD ranged from around .5 to 1 across people 
for each of the three conditions. Therefore, instructions may be necessary to reduce such 
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variability. We found that although the sure instruction was useful in reducing inter-
individual variability in interpretations of BRD, there was no such effect for the firmly 
convinced instruction. In addition, we observed that both the sure and firmly convinced 
instructions were ineffective in reducing intra-individual variability in people’s 
interpretations of BRD. Indeed, the spread of interpretations of BRD was around 40 
percentage points in each of the three conditions. Our findings are compatible with research 
also demonstrating significant differences in the ability of instructions to reduce inter- and 
intra-individual variability in interpretations of BRD (Dhami, 2008; Dhami et al., 2015).  
Beyond examining the effect of judicial instructions on people’s interpretations of 
BRD, it is useful to investigate people’s reported understanding of BRD because perceived 
difficulties in understanding the law may be associated with juror stress (Bornstein et al., 
2005), and this can have a negative effect on decision-making (Mather & Lighthall, 2012). 
Judicial instructions may have a role in increasing jurors’ sense of understanding of what is 
required and thus could reduce juror stress. We found that when people were asked to report 
how easy or difficult it was for them to understand the concept of BRD, there was no 
difference between the sure and undefined conditions. However, in the firmly convinced 
condition participants reported greater ease of understanding compared to the undefined 
condition. One possible explanation for these findings may be that ‘being sure’ refers to an 
internal mental state in the same way that ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ does, whereas ‘being 
firmly convinced’ refers to an external source providing certainty such as that of having been 
convinced by legal argumentation. This and other potential explanations need to be explored 
in future research.  
Understanding and interpreting the concept of BRD are different from having 
confidence in applying the standard. Again, one might expect judicial instructions to increase 
jurors’ confidence in applying the law. Jurors lacking in confidence may be more likely to 
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acquit or struggle to reach consensus on a verdict. In the only past study to examine 
confidence in applying the standard of proof, Horowitz and Kirkpatrick (1996) found that 
participants had greater confidence in their verdicts under the firmly convinced instruction 
than when the standard was undefined. Until now, no-one has examined the effect of the sure 
instruction on confidence. In the present study, we found no significant effect of judicial 
instructions (i.e., sure, firmly convinced and undefined) on people’s reported confidence in 
applying BRD. We found that average levels of confidence were around 5 as measured on a 
7-point scale. Upon further exploration of the data we found a significant negative correlation 
of -.21 between the spread of interpretations of BRD (i.e., intra-individual variability) and 
confidence in applying the undefined standard. This suggests that the more fuzzy the concept 
of BRD is in an individual’s mind, the less confident he/she feels in applying the standard.  
Judicial instructions are meant to be used across a broad spectrum of society (i.e., the 
jury-eligible public), and so should be equally effective across different segments of the 
population. This raises the importance of studying individual differences in interpretations of 
BRD as well as confidence in applying the standard. However, few researchers have done so. 
Nagel (1979) found that males had higher interpretations of BRD than females when the 
standard was undefined. Zander (2000) found that females had higher interpretations of BRD 
than males under the sure instruction. We did not observe any significant differences in peak 
and spread of interpretations of BRD according to people’s demographic characteristics (i.e., 
age, gender and education level) across the three instruction conditions (i.e., sure, firmly 
convinced and undefined. However, we found that there was a tendency for younger people 
(i.e., under 31) to be less confident in applying the standard than their older counterparts. In 
addition, less educated females were significantly less confident in applying the standard than 
their more educated counterparts. These findings reinforce the importance of ensuring people 
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not only understand and interpret BRD as intended but that they also feel confident in 
applying it.  
Potential Implications 
Policy and practical implications emerge from these findings. First, instructions aimed 
at defining the standard of proof for jurors in terms of the sure and firmly convinced language 
may not be necessary, given that jurors’ interpretations of BRD when it is undefined already 
reach the desirable threshold for conviction. Indeed, currently, some jurisdictions in the US 
such as Illinois, Mississippi, Texas and in Australia such as New South Wales leave the 
standard undefined. As Heffer (2006, p. 168) points out, in New South Wales, judges advise 
jurors that the words BRD are “ordinary everyday words” and thus should be self-
explanatory.  
However, where the judicial instructions could be of value is in efforts at reducing the 
inter-individual variability in interpretations of BRD, increasing people’s reported 
understanding of the standard, and reducing any individual differences in people’s 
interpretations of BRD, as well as their confidence in applying the standard.  
The sure instruction, while maintaining the same desired threshold for conviction as 
the undefined standard, led to lower inter-individual variability in interpretations of BRD 
than when the standard was undefined. Similarly, the ‘firmly convinced’ instruction also led 
to the same desired threshold as when the standard was undefined, but it also increased self-
reported understanding of BRD compared to the undefined standard. However, neither the 
sure nor the firmly convinced instructions reduced intra-individual variability in 
interpretations of BRD compared to when the standard was undefined. In addition, neither of 
these two instructions increased people’s confidence in applying the standard beyond the 
undefined standard.  
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Although the two instructions examined in the present study did not do so, some form 
of judicial instructions for BRD may be helpful to improve older people’s interpretations of 
BRD so the concept is less fuzzy in their minds. Women with lower levels of education may 
also benefit from instructions that increase their confidence in applying the standard. 
Potential Limitations 
It could be argued that the external validity of the present findings is limited because 
mock jurors were used rather than real jurors, and that we studied the standard of proof 
outside the context of a legal case. It would be inappropriate to study real juries in real trial 
situations where the wording of the standard of proof was manipulated experimentally, as we 
did in the present study. We made a concerted effort to minimize these limitations in several 
ways.  
First, unlike most past psychological research on jury decision-making that utilizes 
student samples as mock jurors (for a review see Devine, Clayton, Dunford, Seying & Pryce, 
2001) we sampled participants from a large company with great diversity in employment 
roles and education levels among their staff. Although this is not equivalent to random 
sampling from the jury eligible population (which to our knowledge has never been done in 
past research on this topic), it did afford the opportunity to study a wide cross-section of 
people in a controlled data collection environment, and enabled examination of individual 
differences.  
Second, it is possible that people’s interpretations of BRD or their perceived 
understanding of the standard may differ if applied to an actual case or if studied in the 
absence of a case. However, theoretically speaking, the interpretation of BRD should not vary 
as a function of case, and Dhami (2008) found no significant difference in people’s 
interpretations of BRD in and outside the context of a real manslaughter case (see also 
Lundrigan et al., 2017). If we had studied BRD in the context of a criminal case our findings 
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would have been potentially limited to that specific type of case. Future research, 
nevertheless, could examine the effects of the sure and firmly convinced instructions in the 
context of a variety of criminal cases.  
Conclusions 
The present study provides some evidence on the effectiveness of two judicial 
instructions that are used in the Anglo-American criminal justice system. We have 
demonstrated that not all judicial instructions are equally useful. We have also highlighted the 
importance of using several outcome measures when evaluating the impact of judicial 
instructions, and demonstrate the usefulness of examining individual differences in people’s 
understanding of the standard of proof under different instructions. Although a practical 
application of the present findings may want to await replication, this study demonstrated that 
efforts to improve legal language would benefit from concurrent empirical testing in order to 
create better instructions and further evidence-based law-making (see also Dhami et al., 
2015).  
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Table 1. 
Means and Standard Deviations of BRD Interpretations by Judicial Instructions  
 
 Undefined Sure Firmly convinced Total 
M SD M SD M SD M SD 
MF Peak 92.30 11.43 92.33 9.70 91.55 10.51 92.08 9.09 
MF Spread 41.80 23.80 40.36 25.15 41.00 25.84 40.33 21.53 
Understanding 3.18 1.69 2.96 1.58 2.77 1.46 2.98 1.21 
Confidence 4.92 1.73 4.86 1.65 5.08 1.53 4.95 1.23 
Note. Self-reported understanding and confidence were measured on 7-point scales with 
higher values representing greater difficulty in understanding of BRD and greater confidence 
in applying the standard.  
  
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT  27 
 
Table 2. 
 
Means and Standard Deviations of BRD Interpretations by Judicial Instructions and 
Demographic Characteristics  
 
 Undefined Sure Firmly convinced 
 M SD M SD M SD 
MF Peak  
Age:            <31 
31 and over 
 
94.36 
91.14 
 
  9.13 
12.38 
 
93.85 
91.54 
 
  9.35 
  9.86 
 
93.13 
90.79 
 
  9.93 
10.79 
Gender:       Male 
                    Female 
92.53 
92.02 
10.83 
12.16 
91.82 
92.92 
10.29 
  9.01 
90.74 
92.47 
10.84 
10.12 
Education:   University  
                    No university 
94.55 
90.59 
  9.28 
12.57 
92.75 
91.95 
10.45 
  9.18 
92.86 
90.48 
10.27 
10.65 
MF Spread 
Age:             <31 
31 and over 
 
36.04 
44.09 
 
22.33 
22.65 
 
33.38 
41.20 
 
26.35 
23.99 
 
35.66 
42.50 
 
25.98 
25.21 
Gender:        Male 
      Female 
37.94 
45.55 
22.62 
24.56 
36.12 
43.01 
23.05 
26.40 
38.70 
41.99 
25.26 
25.87 
Education:   University 
                    No university 
39.10 
43.61 
25.20 
22.40 
36.79 
41.44 
26.25 
23.65 
39.18 
41.28 
27.44 
24.11 
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Table 3. 
 
Means and Standard Deviations of Confidence in Applying BRD by Judicial Instructions and 
Demographic Characteristics  
 
 
 Undefined Sure Firmly convinced 
 M SD M SD M SD 
Age:            <31 
31 and over 
4.35 
5.19 
 1.87 
1.60 
4.93 
4.81 
1.59 
1.67 
5.02 
5.10 
1.43 
1.59 
Gender:       Male 
                    Female 
5.39 
3.37 
1.58 
1.73 
5.07 
4.62 
1.56 
4.62 
5.27 
4.86 
1.48 
1.58 
Education:   University  
                    No university 
5.06 
4.79 
1.54 
1.85 
4.83 
4.89 
1.72 
1.60 
5.23 
4.96 
1.78 
1.58 
Note. Confidence was measured on 7-point scales with higher values representing greater 
confidence in applying the standard.  
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Figure 1.  
Two-Way Interaction Effect of Gender by Education Level for Confidence in Applying BRD 
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